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Notes
Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives:

Proposition 65
by
KARA CHRISTENSON*

During the pre-election campaign, proponents of the Safe Drinking
Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65) promised California
citizens great things.1 They promised safer drinking water, warnings
before exposure to dangerous substances, more effective enforcement,
and more complete government disclosure regarding hazardous substances.2 Yet, although the Act originated as an initiative, 3 its future
may be out of the hands of the electorate. Currently, the legislature has
the power to amend the law, 4 while administrative agencies are charged
with its implementation.5 This authority is limited only by a simple
condition that regulations and amendments to the statute be in furtherance of its purposes.6 This criterion is an especially significant factor in
forecasting the extent to which the promises of Proposition 65 will be
fulfilled.
Although the future of this initiative depends on the "furtheranceof-purposes standard," the purposes of Proposition 65 are not set out
clearly. As a result, both the state legislature and the courts face an interpretation problem. This interpretation issue is not unique to Proposition 65. Case law reveals other situations when the courts have had to
*

B.A., University of Virginia, 1984; Member, Second Year Class.

1. This Note refers to the statute as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986 and as Proposition 65, as it was called on the November 1986 ballot. The statute
is now codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West Supp. 1989).

2. See, e.g., Reiner, Torres & Newman, Argument in Favor of Proposition 65 in CALI54 (Nov. 4, 1986) (hereinafter BALLOT

FORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION
PAMPHLET).

3.

Initiatives are one type of "direct democracy" whereby the voters, rather than their

elected representatives, decide whether a proposed measure should become law. See infra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
4. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, § 7; CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25249 (West Supp. 1989) (historical note).
5.
6.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12 (West Supp. 1989).
Id.
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discern the intent behind an initiative in order to interpret the law. Despite the number of initiative measures passed by California voters, however, the courts have not developed clear standards for ascertaining the
intent behind initiative statutes. This Note examines various factors
courts have used to determine the purposes of an initiative, develops a
test that can be used by the legislature or the courts, and applies the test
to Proposition 65.
Part I of the Note describes the background of the initiative process
in general and Proposition 65 in particular. Part II analyzes decisions by
California courts involving the interpretation of initiatives. This section
will focus on four well-known California initiatives and the factors applied by the courts in interpreting them. Part III of the Note then applies these factors to Proposition 65, to determine the purposes of the
statute. Finally, Part IV examines two proposed amendments to the statute and analyzes whether they further the purposes of Proposition 65.
I.

Background

As a foundation upon which proposals for initiative construction
and interpretation of Proposition 65 will build, this Note begins with a
broad look at the initiative process and the mechanics and controversies
surrounding the adoption of Proposition 65.
A.

Initiatives

To better appreciate the significance of Proposition 65's initiative
status, it is useful to examine initiatives in general. This form of legislation is based on a grassroots attitude toward lawmaking that historically
has invoked deference from the courts, but is increasingly subject to
criticism.
(1) History
Most California voters are well acquainted with initiative measures.
The state ballot for the November 1988 election, for example, contained
twelve initiative propositions on subjects ranging from AIDS antibody
testing7 to no-fault automobile insurance8 to an increased cigarette tax. 9
Although initiatives are familiar, their history and the legal debates regarding their advantages and disadvantages are less known.
The initiative power is one of three types of direct democracy-"a
system of government in which the people possess a direct voice in the
lawmaking process."'10 An initiative is a statute or constitutional amendCALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION 70-73, 127 (Nov. 8, 1988).
8. Id. at 98-101, 140-144.
9. Id. at 82-85.
10. Eastman, Squelching Vox Populi: Judicial Review of the Initiative in California, 25

7.
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ment proposed by the voting public, instead of the legislature." In California, the initiative power has special status because it is a constitutional
right.' 2 Moreover, the state constitution specifies that while the legislative power is vested in the California legislature, the people reserve the
initiative power to themselves.13 This reservation of power, as compared
to a grant of power, implies that the source of the lawmaking power is
the people of the state, rather than the legislature. '4 This demonstrates
the fundamental nature of the initiative power in California as a right of
the people to make laws independent of elected representatives.
The initiative power in California is the product of an amendment to
the state constitution during the Progressive era.' 5 In the early part of
this century, the Progressive movement was an important political influence advocating broader governing power for the populace.' 6 Underlying Progressive doctrine was a cynicism towards the lawmaking process
of the time, and particularly a belief that the legislatures were responding
to the demands of moneyed interests rather than the needs of the people. 17 The initiative process became part of the Progressive platform as a
means for the people to circumvent corrupt legislatures.
The unique nature of the initiative often has been recognized by the
California courts, which give special deference to the initiative power.
For example, the California Supreme Court has held that "[the] power of
initiative must be liberally construed.. . to promote the democratic process."'18 Furthermore, statutes enacted through the initiative process are
SANTA CLARA L. REV.529, 530 (1985). Direct democracy has two other methods in addition
to the initiative. The referendum is a measure proposed by the legislature but depends upon
the vote of the electorate for passage. The recall is a means by which the voting population
may remove an elected official from office before her term expires. See Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirabilityand Constitutionalityof Legislatingby Initiative,61 S.CAL. L.
REV.735, 735 (1988) (authored by Synthia L. Fontaine).
11. Note, supra note 10, at 735.
12.
13.

CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

14. See Note, New Limits on the CaliforniaInitiative: An Analysis and Critique, 19 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1986) (authored by Greg M. Salvato).
15. Id. at 1049.
16. See Note, supra note 10, at 736. Eighteen out of the twenty-two states that provide
for the initiative process adopted it between 1898 and 1914, when the Progressive movement
was in full force. States that have adopted the initiative process include: South Dakota (1898),
Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan (1908), Missouri (1908), Arkansas
(1910), Colorado (1910), Arizona (1911), California (1911), Montana (1911), Idaho (1912),
Ohio (1912), Nebraska (1912), Nevada (1912), Washington (1912), North Dakota (1914),
Alaska (1959), Florida (1968), Wyoming (1968), Illinois (1970). See Note, supra note 14, at
1050 n.27.
17. See Note, supra note 10, at 736. Ironically, a widespread criticism of the initiative
process today is that it has succumbed to lobbyists and media campaigns representing wealthy
industries. See, eg., L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at II 6, col. 1 (editorial commenting on the
"No on 65" media campaign).
18. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210, n.3, 529
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protected to some extent from amendment by the legislature. According
to the California Constitution, initiatives can be amended by the legislature only if the amendment is approved by the electorate.19 Amendment
20
without voter approval, however, is possible if specified in the initiative.
Thus, both the origin of the initiative process and judicial policy
toward the process in California illustrate its significance as a means by
which the people can promote their concerns, as well as a determination
to protect this power from those who would curtail it.
(2) The Advantages and Disadvantages of Initiatives

The initiative process is not without detractors. Perhaps as a consequence of controversial initiative propositions on recent California ballots, 21 the initiative process itself has become controversial. According
to the League of Women Voters, the battle line over the pros and cons of
initiatives can be drawn between those who favor "representative, or republican, principles of government and [those who prefer] democratic,
'22
direct participatory, principles."
P.2d 570, 572 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 n.3 (1974) (citing Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325,
328, 431 P.2d 650, 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1967); Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 809, 270
P.2d 481, 484 (1954)), dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976). Recently, however, the California
Supreme Court has barred two initiatives from the ballot. One involved the reapportionment
of political districts in the state. Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d
17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). The other required the legislature to adopt a resolution calling
on the United States Congress to submit a balanced budget. Amer. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 36
Cal. 3d 687, 692-94, 686 P.2d 609, 612-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92-93 (1984). According to one
commentator, these cases "reversed the traditional standard of judicial deference towards the
initiative... [and] narrowed the scope of the people's initiative power." Note, supra note 13,
at 1047.
19. CAL. CJNST. art. 2, § 10(c).
20. Note, supra note 14, at 1047. Section 7 of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Initiative allows for amendment by the legislature without voter approval: "To further its purposes, this initiative may be amended by statute, passed in each house by two-thirds
vote." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West 1989) (historical note).
21. See, e.g., Proposition 8, The Victim's Bill of Rights (changing evidentiary rules in
criminal trials and eliminating the reduced capacity defense) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); id. §§ 1191.1-1192.7 (West
1982 & Supp. 1989); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West 1984 & Supp.
1989);Proposition 9, the Political Reform Act of 1974 (requiring government officials to disclose financial ties that may conflict with their public duties) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 81000-91015 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann Initiative (limiting
the amount of taxes owed by owners of real property) (current version at CAL. CONST. art.
XIIIA); Proposition 51, the Deep-Pocket Initiative (limiting joint and several liability in tort
suits to economic damages only) (codified at CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp.
1989).
22.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN

CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 84 (1984).
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Supporters of direct democracy commonly assert that its greatest
benefit is that it reinforces Americans' image of self-government.2 3 According to this view, initiatives are the most valid way to make laws,
because they are the best reflection of the values of the people.2 4 Supporters also point to the initiative process as a useful means to overcome
legislative inaction.2 5 Elected representatives may fail to enact laws if
they are reluctant to take politically unpopular positions. The initiative
process allows the people to enact laws that the legislature is unwilling to
pass.
Proponents of initiatives also maintain that direct democracy allows
voters to become more involved in the political process and more aware
of the issues that affect them. 26 This result, in turn, makes legislatures
more responsive to the electorate. Representatives feel greater pressure
to please voters and are less attracted
to the promises of lobbyists and
27
those offering political favors.
Critics of the initiative process argue that direct democracy is decidedly un-American because it violates the United States Constitution's
guarantee of a republican form of government.2 As a consequence, opponents argue, the process allows for majority rule at the expense of minority groups. 29 Opponents also counter the supporters' claim that
initiatives provide for a better informed electorate. Critics say the contrary is more likely because advertising for initiative campaigns focuses
on emotional and superficial arguments.
The result is an uninformed, or
30
at least a misinformed public.
Critics of the initiative process also question the ability of voters to
comprehend initiative propositions. Although initiative proposals must
be limited to a single subject, 3 ' their substance and ramifications can be
complex. Proposition 65 is an obvious example. A primary concern of
23.
24.

Id. at 85; Eastman, supra note 10, at 531.
D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION 28 (1984).

25. Id. But see Walters, PublicPolicy Gridlock- The Initiative as Decidedly BadLawmaking, L.A. Daily J., July 14, 1986, at 4, col. 6 ("The Legislature invited this flood of simplistic,
viscerally appealing initiatives by creating the impression, through its own inactions, of
gridlock on major public policy questions. The opportunity has been exploited by those with
axes to grind and pockets to fill.").
26. See Eastman, supra note 10, at 531.
27. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 24, at 27-28; LEAGUE, supra note 19, at 85.
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The United States Supreme Court, however, ruled in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912), that the constitutionality of the
initiative process is a nonjusticiable political question. See Note, supra note 10, at 759-76
(arguing that the initiative process violates the Guaranty Clause of the United States
Constitution).
29. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 24, at 30; Note, supra note 10, at 747-51.
30. See Note, supra note 10, at 741. See generally King, Political TV- Marketing of a
Proposition,L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1986, at I 1, cbl. I (regarding media strategies of the opponents of Proposition 65).
31. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
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that law is determining acceptable levels of risk of harm from toxic substances. Risk assessment 32 is a highly technical process involving issues
that have not been resolved even in the scientific community.
As a consequence of this complexity, many citizens may be interested less in ballot propositions than in candidate elections. Thus, as one
critic has asserted, fewer people vote on propositions than on candidates
and "the result is nonparticipation on the propositions and greater alienation in the electorate. ' 33 Therefore, "the outcomes of ballot propositions are a reflection more of luck or voter whim than of reasoned
judgment. .... ,,34
In addition, critics of direct democracy assert that excluding initiatives from the fine-tuning process of legislative debate, compromise and
review produces inferior results. 35 Without the feedback provided by the
legislative process, initiatives allow ambiguous and unworkable laws to
36
be passed.
In the face of these criticisms, calls for reform of the initiative process have been made. 37 Yet, few would seek to abolish the initiative
power. Given the democratic nature of the initiative, such a move would
be politically unpopular. Moreover, as the proponents of Proposition 65
would no doubt agree, good laws have resulted from the process. These
people would support direct democracy, since that process allowed the
voters of California to speak out against toxic pollution and its attendant
threat to human health.
The criticisms of the initiative process, however, indicate the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of an initiative statute. Not only are
initiative statutes excluded from the legislative process, but as a result, no
legislative history is available to a court. Courts instead must attempt to
determine the intent of the electorate using various factors. This intent
may be difficult to determine, however, given the problems of voter comprehension of, and participation in, the initiative process.
B. Proposition 65
The above factors undoubtedly will contribute to a divisive process
when determining the intent of Proposition 65. Prior to its passage, the
law stirred substantial controversy. 38 Passage of the initiative did little to
32. For a discussion of the problems associated with risk assessment, see Lipkin, The
Risky Business of Assessing Danger, INSIGHT, May 23, 1988, at 8; Note, California's Toxics
Initiative: Making It Work, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1209-17 (1988) (authored by Judith A.
DeFranco).
33. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 24, at 29.
34. Id. at 123.
35. Id. at 29-30; Note, supra note 10, at 743-46.
36. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 24, at 29-30; Note, supra note 10, at 743-46.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 14, 1988, at A24, col. 2.
38. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at 1 12, col. 1; L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at I 3,
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resolve the controversy-litigation has burgeoned since the passage and
implementation of Proposition 65. 39 The debate can be stated simply:
whether Proposition 65 is a "[c]alamity or a [l]egal [c]atalyst." 4 The
law poses the threat of significant liability to businesses, even those that
are not normally associated with toxic substances, such as supermarkets
and newspaper publishers. 4 1 On the other hand, Proposition 65 is
designed to "accelerate the transition from science to law," 42 by motivating industry to help determine whether the thousands of new chemicals
created every week are hazardous to human health. Examining the features of the law and the arguments of both its supporters and critics provides a background helpful in discerning the purposes of the initiative.
(1) Mechanics and Provisions
Proposition 65 is similar in many respects to other federal and state
environmental laws. Typically, this type of statute grants a department
of the executive branch authority to identify which substances are covered by the statute and to compile a list of those substances. 43 The statute covers only listed substances; thus, the listing provision serves as a
trigger for other provisions of the law. Proposition 65 also includes sections regarding discharges of listed substances and warnings of exposure
to those chemicals. Upon closer examination, however, Proposition 65
diverges significantly from other laws. It shifts the burden of proof, allows for substantial recovery by private citizens, and exempts all governmental agencies from its provisions. These distinguishing provisions are
discussed in section III.
a. The Listing Procedure
The listing procedure is an appropriate starting point for an examination of Proposition 65 since the other provisions of the statute are not
triggered unless a substance has been listed by the statute. Proposition
65 directs the Governor to compile a list that includes, at a minimum,
substances classified in the Labor Code as probable carcinogens. 44 In
col. 5 (Newspaper accounts describing the central debates and issues during the pre-election
campaign of Proposition 65).
39. See infra note 73.
40. L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at I 3, col. 5.
41. See generally, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 2. Supermarkets that
sell products containing carcinogens or reproductive toxins could be liable for selling those
products if they are not labelled according to the statute. Newspapers may be printed with
inks that could contain substances listed under the law.
42. Lipkin, supra note 32, at 9.
43. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act § 307, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317 (1982); Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 7412, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 § 102, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9602 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(a) (West Supp. 1989). Sections 6382(b)(1)
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addition, a substance is to be included on the Proposition 65 list if any
one of several conditions apply. First, if experts appointed by the Governor determine that a substance "has been clearly shown through scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity" 45 it must be placed on the list. Second,

the list will include a substance if a scientific body that the Governor's
experts consider to be authoritative "formally identified [the substance]
as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity.

'46

Finally, a substance will

be placed on the Proposition 65 list if "an agency of the state or federal
government has formally required it to be labeled or identified as causing
cancer or reproductive toxicity.

'4 7

Currently, over two hundred sub-

stances are listed under Proposition 65 as causing either cancer or repro48
ductive toxicity.

b. The Discharge Prohibition
Once a substance has been listed, the statute prohibits businesses
from knowingly 49 discharging it anywhere "where such chemical passes
or probably will pass into any source of drinking water."' 50 Such a discharge, however, is exempt from the statute's sanctions if the chemical
has not been listed for more than twenty months; or the discharge did
not result in the release of a "significant amount" 5' of the substance and
and 6382(d) of the California Labor Code refer to probable carcinogens identified by the National Toxicology Program (by reference to the federal Hazard Communication Standard, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988), and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. One criticism of Proposition 65 is that the lists developed by these agencies were not intended to be
used for comprehensive regulation of carcinogens. James R. Fouts of the National Toxicology
Program (NTP) stated that NTP's list of probable carcinogens was intended to be "an information vehicle to stimulate inquiries as to whether these chemicals should be regulated, not...
the list of chemicals to be regulated." Beardsley, As CaliforniaGoes .. , 1988, Sci. AM. 20.
45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(b) (West Supp. 1989).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 12000 (1988). The list includes substances such as
asbestos, benzene, chewing tobacco, and tobacco smoke.
49. The term "knowingly" can signify various degrees of intent. According to the proponents of Proposition 65, the law would apply "only to businesses that know they are putting
one of the chemicals out into the environment, and that know the chemical is actually on the
Governor's list." in BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2,at 54. The current regulations require
knowledge of the discharge or exposure, but not knowledge that it is unlawful. CAL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 22, § 12201(d) (1988).
50. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West Supp. 1989).
51. The statute defines a "significant amount" as "any detectable amount," Id.
§ 24249.1 1(c), unless it poses "no significant risk." Id. § 25249.10(c). The determination of
"no significant risk" varies according to whether the substance is a carcinogen or reproductive
toxin. No significant risk as applied to carcinogens, assumes lifetime exposure to the substance. As applied to reproductive toxins, the term means that the substance has "no observable effect" on experimental subjects exposed to the chemical at 1000 times the level listed
under the statute as safe.
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the discharge complies with "all other laws'52and . . . every applicable
regulation, permit, requirement, and order."
c. The Warning Requirement
The statute also prohibits businesses from "knowingly and intentionally" 53 exposing the public to any listed substance "without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual."' 54 Like the
discharge prohibition, this section is subject to certain exemptions. The
warning requirement does not apply when state law is preempted by federal laws regarding exposure to the substance.5 5 The requirement is also
excused if the substance has not been on the Proposition 65 list for at
least twelve months.5 6 In addition, the warning requirement is not triggered if exposure to a carcinogenic substance "poses no significant risk
assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question," or if exposure to a
reproductive toxin "will have no observable effect'57assuming exposure at
one thousand (1000) times the level in question.
d. Enforcement
The statute provides for injunctive relief 5 8 and civil 59 and criminal
penalties.6 0 The state attorney general, a district attorney, or a city attor61
ney of a city with a population over 750,000, may enforce the statute. 62
In addition, the law provides for enforcement by private citizens.
Those successfully prosecuting an action under Proposition 65, whether
government or private plaintiffs, receive twenty-five percent of the damages awarded.6 3 In addition, fifty percent of the award is distributed to
an account designated for problems resulting from hazardous sub52. Id. § 24249.9 (West Supp. 1989).
53. Id. For a definition of the term "knowingly," see supra note 49.
54. Id. § 25249.6 (West Supp. 1989).

55. Id. § 25249.10(a).
56. Id. § 25249.10(b).
57. Id. § 25249.10(c).
58. IM.§ 25249.7(a).
59. Id. § 25249.7(b). Civil penalties can amount to $2500 per day for each violation.
According to one commentator, "[t]his penalty provision is stiff. Each such 'violation' is likely
to mean each discharge or release, or each exposure without warning, to each individual so
affected." NOSSAMAN, GUTHNER, KNOX & ELLIOTT, SURVIVING PROPOSITION 65 120 (1987)
[hereinafter NOSSAMAN].

60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25189.5 (West Supp. 1989). Criminal penalties
range from $5000 to $100,000 for each day of the violation. Stricter penalties apply, however,
if the violation caused "great bodily injury or caused a substantial probability that death could
result." In those situations, convicted violators face up to 36 months in prison and fines up to
$250,000 for each day of violation. Id.
61. Id. § 25249.7(c).
62. Id. § 25249.7(d).
63. Id. § 25192(a).
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stances. 64 The remaining twenty-five percent is allocated to the health
officer in the jurisdiction in which the violation occurred to be used for
enforcement of the statute. 65 Finally, the statute imposes a duty on government employees to disclose information regarding illegal discharges of
listed substances to the local government. Government employees who
knowingly and intentionally fail to meet this obligation may face impris66
onment or fines.

(2) Controversy and Proposition 65

Conflict has surrounded Proposition 65 from its inception. Proposition 65 garnered substantial media coverage and publicity, despite the
competition it faced from other controversial initiative measures competing for voter attention in 1986, including propositions to make English
the official language of California, 67 to quarantine AIDS victims, 68 and to
limit joint and several liability for non-economic injuries. 69 The money
spent on the issue indicates the intense interest in the measure. According to one account, opponents of Proposition 65 raised $4.5 million in
their unsuccessful attempt to defeat it, while proponents of the measure
70
spent $1.65 million.
In addition, the 1986 gubernatorial campaign was drawn into the
debate. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, a Democrat, supported the
initiative; incumbent Governor George Deukmejian opposed it.7 I Both
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 25180.7 (b), (c). Employees may be subject to prison terms of up to three years,
fines of $5000 to $25,000 and forfeiture of government employment for violations of this
provision.
67. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 44-47.
68. Id. at 48-5 1.
69. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION 32-35 (June 3, 1986) (codified at CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1989)).
70. CorporationsSpend Heavily to Beat Prop 65, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 30, 1986, at 2, col 2.
71. L.A. Times, October 13, 1986, at I 20, col. 1. Candidates in the senatorial campaign
also were forced to take a stand on the initiative. See L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at I 30, col. I
(regarding Ed Zschau's decision to oppose Proposition 65).
Some political analysts believed that Proposition 65 was a Democratic tool to help Los
Angeles Mayor Bradley woo voters away from incumbent Governor George Deukmejian. See
L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at 1 27, col. 1 ("Proposition 65 was created and financed largely by
supporters of Bradley, who hope that it is drawing attention to a favorite Bradley issue and
helping him in his race against Republican Gov. George Deukmejian."). The anti-65 campaign endorsed this view, "suggesting that the measure was little more than political mischiefmaking." King, Political TV- Marketing of a Proposition, L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1986, at I 21,
col. 4. According to the initiative's victorious proponents, however, this tactic was pure error
on the part of the opposition: "Their false assumption was that it was a Bradley initiative.
We thought it was confusing partisan
That was their fatal mistake from the beginning ...
instincts with voter instincts ... They underestimated the sheer potency of the toxics issue
itself." King, Political TV- Marketing of a Proposition,L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1986, at I 39, col.
2 (quoting State Assemblyman Tom Hayden).
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Governor Deukmejian and Proposition 65 won the approval of the voters
that year, a fact that may explain part of the continuing controversy regarding implementation of the initiative. Deukmejian's administration is
now responsible for implementing and overseeing a law that the Governor campaigned against. One of the members of the Scientific Advisory
panel appointed by the Governor actually co-wrote the "Argument
Against Proposition 65" contained in the ballot pamphlet. 72 The numerous lawsuits challenging regulations issued by the Deukmejian administrations pursuant to Proposition 65 attest to the political difficulties
involved in the implementation of the statute. 73 As further evidence of
the fractiousness surrounding the statute, State Attorney General, John
Van de Kamp, who supported the initiative during the campaign, 74 has
75
refused to represent the Governor in some of the litigation.
In addition to administrative implementation of the law, the State
legislature has power to shape the statute's future through its authority
to amend laws passed as initiatives. Within a few months of the Act's
passage, bills proposing to amend the law were introduced in the State
Assembly and Senate. For example, an amendment was proposed to
make the Act apply to government agencies. 76 Another proposed change
to the statute would have reduced the amount citizens could recover
through successful prosecution of violators of the Act. 77 Neither propo-

sal survived the legislative process, but it is likely that Proposition 65 will

undergo revision by the legislature. 7 The legislature, however, does not
have free reign to amend the Act since amendments to the statute must
72. See Arres, Voss & Ottoboni, Argument AgainstProposition 65 in BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 2, at 55. Dr. Bruce Ames, Chairman of the Department of Biochemistry at the
University of California, Berkeley, urged voters to vote against Proposition 65. He is currently
a member of the Scientific Advisory Panel that is responsible for listing the chemicals subject
to regulation under the statute. Marshall, California'sDebate on Carcinogens, 237 SCIENCE
1459 (March 20, 1987).
73. In AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, No. 348195 (Sacramento Super. Ct. filed Feb. 27, 1987),
the plaintiffs challenged the Governor's initial list of substances covered by the statute because
it included only known human carcinogens, rather than chemicals known to cause cancer in
laboratory animals as well. The court ordered Governor Deukmejian to expand the list from
twenty-nine chemicals to cover well over two hundred. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 9 (May 1, 1987).
A second lawsuit, AFL-CIO v. Warriner, No. 359223 (Sacramento Super. Ct. filed May 31,
1988), challenged an exemption in the regulations for food, drugs, and cosmetics. A third
lawsuit, AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, No. 359223 (Sacramento Super. Ct. filed June 22, 1988), is
directed against the Scientific Advisory Panel, the members of which are appointed by the
Governor. The Panel maintains the position that they are the only scientifically authoritative
group under the statute, and thus, only they may designate chemicals to be covered by the law.
74. See Van de Kamp, A Toxics Law With Teeth, L.A. Times, Oct. 31, 1986, at II 5, col.
1.
75. See Marshall, supra note 72, at 1459.
76. S.B. 269, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1987-88 (introduced by Sen. Kopp).
77. A.B. 1332, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1987-88 (introduced by Assemblymember Wright).
78. L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1986, at II 4, col. 1.
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"further its purposes."' 79 Thus, issues arise regarding the power of the
legislature to amend Proposition 65: what are the purposes of Proposition 65 and what criteria should be used to evaluate whether a proposed
amendment is in furtherance of these purposes? To answer these questions one must determine first how the law has allowed other initiatives
to be interpreted.
II.

Developing a Test to Interpret Initiatives

Unlike the usual lawmaking process, laws originating as initiatives
leave no legislative trail. No debate in the Assembly or Senate has taken
place, no prior versions of the law-with deletions in strikeout type and
additions in italicized type-are available. Thus, construing these laws
and determining the intent of the electorate that approved them makes
the often speculative job of statutory construction even more difficult.
In analyzing an initiative it is useful to consider basic guidelines regarding statutory construction that apply to laws passed as initiatives as
well as those passed through the legislative process. Section 1858 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure governs the role of the court in construing a statute. It provides:
In the construction of a statute.., the office of the judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained
therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been
inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.80
In addition, section 1859 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that "[i]n
the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature ... is to be

pursued, if possible." 8 Furthermore, case law relates construction of
conventional legislative statutes to that of laws passed as initiatives: "It
is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a court should ascertain the intent of the lawmakers in order to effectuate the purpose of the
applies with equal force to initiative measures adopted by
law. This rule '82
the electorate."
In the context of initiative construction, ascertaining the intent of
the lawmakers requires determining the intent of the voters. To accomplish this task, courts have used various factors, but have not developed a
clear or standardized test. In examining judicial initiative construction it
is useful to consider four cases that involve statutes that, like Proposition
79.

Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act § 7, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE §§ 25249.5 (West Supp. 1989) (historical note).
80. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1858 (West 1983).

81.

Id.§ 1859.

82. People v. Callegri, 154 Cal. App. 3d 856, 866, 202 Cal. Rptr. 109, 115 (1984) (citing
Sand v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 567, 571, 668 P.2d 787, 789, 194 Cal. Rptr. 480, 482 (1983);
Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
245, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978)).
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65, originated as controversial initiative measures. These initiatives in83
clude: Proposition 9, also known as the Fair Political Practices Act;
8
4
Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann tax limitation initiative; Proposition 8,
the Victims' Bill of Rights; 85 and Proposition 51, the "deep pocket" initiative. 86 Factors applied by courts to analyze the intent underlying these
initiatives include the language of the statute, the events leading to its
passage, the arguments and summaries found in the ballot pamphlet, and
the construction by the legislature and agencies responsible for implementing the statute. Similarly, the legislature and the courts are likely to
employ these factors when considering whether an amendnient to Proposition 65 furthers the law's purposes.
A.

Statutory Language

Although many factors are used to interpret an initiative statute, the
obvious starting point is the language of the law itself. As Justice Traynor once stated:
The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer. It may
also properly rely on extrinsic aids, the history of the statute, the legislative debates, committee reports, statements to the voters on initiative
and referendum measures. Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the purpose of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, reminders that whether
or folly, it was wittingly undertaken
their arrangement was wisdom
87
and not to be disregarded.

Thus, courts have examined the words of initiative statutes at the beginning of the construction process. For example, in a recent decision involving the intent of Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court stated,
to give
"We are directed first to the 'words themselves' and cautioned
88
meaning."1
accepted
generally
and
ordinary
their
them
In some cases, the wording of an initiative reveals its purposes with
an explicit statement of its goals. For example, Proposition 9 contains
three provisions that would come to the aid of future courts faced with
83. Proposition 9, the Political Reform Act of 1974, at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8100091015 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989)).
84. Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann Initiative (current version at CAL. CONST. art.
XIIIA).
85. Proposition 8, the Victim's Bill of Rights (codified at CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 28; CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1191.1, 1192.7
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1989)).
86. Proposition 51, the Deep-Pocket Initiative (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 14311431.5 (West Supp. 1989)).
87. People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1, 5 (1950).
88. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 309-10, 696 P.2d 111, 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 723
(1985) (citing People v. Block, 32 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 648 P.2d 104, 105, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 455
(1982)).
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construing the measure. The section subtitled "Findings and declaration" clearly states the problems intended to be remedied by the statute. 89 Another section sets forth the goals of the statute by plainly
stating, "The people enact this title to accomplish the following purposes .... -90 A third section specifically instructs that "this title should
be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes." 9 1 Although not all
initiative statutes declare their purposes so straightforwardly, inclusion
of provisions such as those in Proposition 9 seems good policy. Then an
individual's vote for the initiative is an affirmative vote for defined goals.
These sections of the statute provide courts with a clear indication of
what voters thought they were voting for, thus assisting courts in interpreting the statute. Furthermore, the danger of inflexibility that would
limit the law's desired effect can be reduced by including a clause like
that in Proposition 9 calling for a liberal construction of the statute.
Without the relatively clear indication of intent provided by these types
of clauses, courts must turn to more subjective-and therefore less accurate-means of interpreting initiative statutes.
B.

Events Leading to Passage-Similar Prior Legislation

A court is not limited in its analysis of an initiative's purposes to the
four corners of the statute. Courts also look at events prior to passage
for clues to the intent of the electorate. This factor can be divided into
two parts: prior legislation on the same topic as the issue in question, and
direct messages to the electorate in the form of ballot pamphlets, news
92
reports and advertisements.
Courts use prior legislation to illuminate the problems the voters
intended their initiative to remedy. For example, in Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Board,93 the
California Supreme Court had to decide whether a regulation under
Proposition 9 unlawfully permitted industry officials to serve on state
regulatory boards and commissions that made decisions affecting their
industry. In interpreting the statute, the court looked at laws similar to
Proposition 994 and found that the regulation was an attempt to harmonize, not nullify, many existing laws allowing such practices. 95
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81001 (West 1987).
90. Id. § 81002.
91. Id. § 81003.
92. To some degree, the two parts overlap. The relevance of prior legislation to voter
intent depends on the extent to which voters were aware of the laws and their effectiveness.
Ballot pamphlets, news reports and advertisements can inform the electorate on this issue.
The messages directed at the electorate, however, concern other aspects of the initiative as

well.
93.
94.
95.

82 Cal. App. 3d 433, 435-36, 147 Cal. Rptr. 265-266 (1978).
Id. at 439-41, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70.
Id. at 444, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
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The challengers of the regulation, however, also used prior legislation to support their case, arguing that a previous law had specifically
exempted industry boards from its purview, but Proposition 9 did not.
The court was not persuaded that this silence was an intentional effort to
apply the law to industry boards, stating that, "[a] reasonable explanation is that the drafters of the Political Reform Act simply overlooked
the problem."' 96 The fact that in this case prior legislation was used by
both sides to construe the intent of the voters warrants caution in relying
solely on this factor. One cannot deny, however, that this factor places
the initiative in a political context that contributes to analysis of the
statute.
Another example of the court's use of prior legislation to interpret
an initiative is found in Evangelatosv. Superior Court.97 The court had to
determine whether the electorate intended the limitations on joint and
several liability imposed by Proposition 51 to apply retroactively.9 8 The
court used an approach similar to the one described above, reviewing
"the history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject." 99
This analysis revealed that legislation similar to Proposition 51 had been
found by the courts to apply prospectively only. In light of these holdings, the court reasoned:
Since the drafters declined to insert such a provision [regarding retroactivity] in the proposition-perhaps in order to avoid the adverse
political consequences that might have flowed from the inclusion of
such a provision-it would appear improper for this court to read a
retroactivity clause into the enactment at this juncture. 10
Arguably, the attention devoted by the Evangelatos court to "the
history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject" could
be applied to factors other than prior legislation. In fact, a lower court
decision, Creighton v. City of Santa Monica,101 did use a broader range of
factors in interpreting a municipal rent control initiative. The court
looked at "the political and social millieu [sic] that existed at the time the
' 10 2 The evidence considered by the
...initiative came before the voters."
court included a recent California Supreme Court decision on rent control, the local housing situation, and the ballot pamphlet. 10 3 Although
the court did not elaborate on these factors to any great degree, the decision demonstrates an openness to considering a wide range of factors that
96. Id. at 445, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
97. 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988).
98. Id. at 1193, 753 P.2d at 586, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 630. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 14311431.5 (West Supp. 1989).
99. Id. at 1210, 753 P.2d at 599, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 643 (citing In re Marriage of Bouquet,
16 Cal. 3d 583, 587, 546 P.2d 1371, 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1976)).
100. Id.at 1212, 753 P.2d at 600, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
101. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 207 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1984).
102. Id. at 1018, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
103. Id.
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might have influenced voters. Moreover, in contrast to information tailored to reach voters, such as news reports and advertising,104 these factors can be based on objective information and statistics. The factors are
still pertinent to voter intent because they describe the circumstances surrounding the initiative campaign, but do not require the same degree of
speculation about voter comprehension as advertisements for and against
an initiative.
Even without the possibility of broader use of relatively objective
factors, the traditional view of prior legislation remains important because it requires the court to consider the initiative in the framework that
it arose. An initiative may be passed because voters believe that existing
laws are ineffective or do not address a problem at all.10 5 Thus, examining an initiative statute to distinguish it from laws existing before the
election can shed light on the intent of the electorate.
C. Events Prior to Passage-Ballot Pamphlets and Messages Directed at
the Electorate
In addition to considering prior legislation, courts often examine
ballot pamphlets when analyzing the purposes of an initiative. Courts
consider the information in ballot pamphlets as an indication of what the
electorate believed the initiative would accomplish. As the California
Supreme Court declared in interpreting Proposition 13, "[W]hen, as
here, the enactment follows voter approval, the ballot summary and arguments and analysis presented to the electorate in connection with a
particular measure may be helpful in determining the probable meaning
06
of uncertain language." 1
07
Use of ballot pamphlets is supported by long-standing precedent1
and is widely accepted. 10 8 For the purposes of interpreting initiatives,
the ballot pamphlet is analogous to the legislative history of a particular
measure. In ascertaining the intent of the electorate when construing an
initiative, the ballot pamphlet is especially significant: it is an impartial
reference available to every voter providing information on the issues
concerning the proposition.
104. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
106. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 245-46, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978).
107. People v. Ottey, 5 Cal. 2d 714, 723, 56 P.2d 193, 197 (1936) (Recognizing that the
"argument sent to the voters ... may be resorted to as an aid in determining the intention of
the framers and the electorate when ... necessary.").
108. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 310, 696 P.2d 111, 116, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 724
(1985); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n. v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 643 P. 2d
941, 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 327 (1982); Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 819,
230 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1986); Creighton v. City of Santa Monica, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1011,
1018, 207 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1984).
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The value of using ballot pamphlets to determine the electorate's
perception of the purposes of a statute, however, has been questioned.
For example, the Consumers Union court did not use ballot pamphlets,
despite clear precedent, to analyze the purposes of an initiative, stating,
"it would be folly to attempt an analysis of what the majority of the
voters had in mind in adopting the PRA [Political Reform Act], especially since we cannot legitimately assume that voters possessed any uniform intention or thought."10 9 According to this court, one reason not
to rely heavily on ballot pamphlets is the fact that although millions of
people receive them, no two voters' interpretations of the information
contained in the pamphlet can be exactly the same. As one writer has
stated: "The ballot pamphlets which describe the proposed law are insufficient to describe the diverse purposes and intentions of the voters who
enact the law; a vote for the law does not necessarily imply a vote for the
purposes and intentions of the law as expressed in the ballot
pamphlet." 110
Another argument for cautious use of ballot pamphlets questions
the number of voters who actually read the pamphlets, comprehend the
information contained inside them, and rely on them when casting their
votes. According to author David Magleby, only thirteen to thirty-three
percent of the electorate use the information in the ballot pamphlet in
deciding how to vote." Magleby also found,
[T]he least readable section of the voter's handbook is the official descriptio .... While the remainder of the handbook is more readable,
citizens still need a reading level equivalent to that of a third-year col[T]his means
lege student in order to understand the document ....
than two-thirds of those who receive the document cannot
that more
112
read it.
It follows from Magleby's conclusion that a court using a ballot pamphlet to discern accurately the intent of the electorate should account in
its analysis for confusion and incomprehension on the part of most
voters.
Magleby's research also suggests that newspaper and television reports and advertising on propositions are more appropriate factors for
consideration. "In proposition elections, voters rely almost entirely upon
the mass media for information about propositions ....

[F]or proposi-

tions, over 80 percent of the voters reported that their most important
109. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd.,
82 Cal. App. 3d 433, 439, 147 Cal. Rptr. 265, 269 (1978). This case was decided the same year

as Amador Valley, which specifically mentioned ballot pamphlets in its analysis, but did not
consider them dispositive.
110.
111.

Note, supra note 10, at 757.
D. MAGLEBY, supra note 24, at 136.

112. Id. at 139.
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source of information was television, radio, or newspapers."' " 3
Magleby's contention regarding the broader influence of these forms of
communication on the electorate suggests that they are more relevant to
the construction of an initiative.
Clearly, however, these communications also present significant
problems. Copies of television and radio reports and advertisements may
not be available. In addition, attempting to discern the intent of the electorate by examining news reports does not eliminate questions of voter
comprehension. Perhaps most importantly, although political advertising may hold great sway over voters, it is often misleading and inherently
slanted. Thus, using advertising as a basis for determining the voters'
conceptions of the objectives of an initiative would be a tricky task for a
court. The lack of cases using advertising as a factor for interpretation
suggests that courts may consider it too speculative to serve as a reliable
guide.
Finally, it should be noted that although the California Supreme
Court in the Amador Valley decision referred to the use of ballot pamphlets in construing an initiative statute, the court gave less weight to the
pamphlet than to other factors: "In the instant matter we have the advantage of both principal interpretive aids, those related to the ballot and
the legislative-administrative construction. We focus primarily on the
latter."'1 14 Thus, although Amador Valley affirms the use of ballot pamphlets and has been cited in subsequent cases as authority to do so,"l 5 the
state supreme court considers that factor to have less significance than
others.
D. Legislative-Administrative Construction
As indicated above, the Amador Valley decision sets out another factor employed by the courts to interpret the purposes of an initiative: how
the legislature and the agencies responsible for its administration have
construed it. California courts have followed a general rule of judicial
deference to the interpretations of the legislature and administrative
agencies. As the Consumers Union court stated, "Legislative findings as
to public purpose, even after the relevant times, are not binding on the
113. Id. at 133.
114. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d. 208, 246, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978).
115. For other cases using ballot pamphlets when interpreting initiative statutes, see People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 310, 696 P.2d 111, 116, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 724 (1985); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 673 n.14, 669 P.2d 17, 25 n.14, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789,
n.14 (1983); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 643 P.2d
941, 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 327 (1982).
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be upheld unless they are
courts, but are given great weight and will
116
found to be unreasonable and arbitrary."
Three reasons underlie this deference. First, both the legislature and
government agencies, which are departments within the executive
branch, are responsible to the people. In theory, their interpretations of
an initiative reflect the views of the constituencies they represent. Second, an agency may have expertise in the particular area that the courts
lack. Third, the statute may have authorized implementation by an
agency and this delegation of responsibility might include an interpretative role for the agency as well.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision also involved deference to legislative-administrative construction. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,117 involved a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of provisions of the Clean
Air Act. The Court held that absent a clear statutory directive from
Congress, a court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of a
statute:
If... the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute ....[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. 11
Other parts of the Chevron holding also are relevant to the issue of
initiative interpretation. For example, a passage in the opinion may foreclose possible policy arguments regarding an initiative whose purposes
are not expressly set forth. As the Court stated, "[p]olicy arguments are
more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to
judges." ' 1 9 The Court also declared that deference to the administrative
view is proper when "the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies." 120 This language may mean that if an initiative does not express its
purposes clearly, challenges to an agency regulation or a legislative
amendment will be difficult. Given the high degree of deference adopted
by the Court, challenges based on policy arguments are unlikely to
succeed.
116.
82 Cal.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd.,
App. 3d 433, 447, 147 Cal. Rptr. 265, 274 (1978).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865.
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It is possible that any particular statute can yield more than one
"reasonable" construction, depending on one's view of the policies underlying the law. The Court's decision, however, presents the possibility
that an argument that an agency interpretation is not the one closest to
the intent of the electorate might fail as long as the administrative determination is reasonable. As the Court stated, "When a challenge to an
agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really
centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must
fail." 2 1
By precluding such arguments, the Chevron decision goes beyond
the standard of deference expressed by the California courts. As articulated by the California Supreme Court in Consumers Union, legislative
interpretations are accorded great weight and are upheld unless they are
found to be unreasonable. 122 There is still room under this California
rule for one to argue that the administrative construction of the statute
was arbitrary because it runs counter to the purposes the electorate.
Under Chevron such an argument would not succeed.
The applicability of the Chevron decision to initiatives is debatable,
however, because the law involved in that case was a federal statute, not
a state initiative. The holding might not apply to states. Moreover, the
focus of inquiry when interpreting initiatives is the intent of the electorate at the time the proposition is passed, 123 but interpretation of legislative statutes focuses on the intent of the legislature. The two involve
distinct categories of inquiry deserving separate analyses on the deference
standard.
Furthermore, contrary to the holdings of Consumers Union and
Amador Valley, in People v. Castro124 the California Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the appropriateness of employing any post-election
factors, including legislative-administrative construction. This case involved the construction of an amendment to the California Constitution
as implemented by Proposition 8. The provision states that "[a]ny prior
felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding . . . shall

subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or
enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding."' 125 The court held
that despite the mandatory language, courts retain discretion to prohibit
121. Id. at 866.
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. People v. Callegri, 154 Cal. App. 3d 856, 866, 202 Cal. Rptr. 109, 115 (1984) (citing
Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
245, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299-1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 257-58 (1978)).
124. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 311-12, 696 P.2d 111, 116-17, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719,
724-25 (1985).
125. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f).
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1 26
such evidence if it would result in undue prejudice to the defendant.
The Castro court rejected as evidence regarding interpretation of the initiative an opinion by the Attorney General and reports prepared by the
state assembly because the court could "only speculate on the extent to
which the voters were cognizant of them."'127 Significantly, the California Supreme Court did not defer to or even consider the views of these
governmental entities, emphasizing the critical nature of voter intent
when interpreting an initiative.
The Castro decision leaves the status of this factor uncertain. The
court did not overrule prior cases explicitly like Consumers Union and
Amador Valley, and in fact acknowledged the traditional "great weight"
accorded to legislative-administrative construction of statutes.1 28 The
court stated simply, "[t]he pronouncements relied on here do not fall into
this category,"1 29 explaining only that there was no indication that the
voters were aware of the evidence. The Amador Valley court, however,
considered post-election legislative implementation of Proposition 13 in
its analysis without questioning its relevance to an inquiry focusing on
voter intent.1 30 The Castro decision did not explain its reasons for rejecting the same type of evidence it considered previously. The fact that
the Castro decision does not overrule the traditional rule of deference to
legislative-administrative construction explicitly, however, suggests that
the rule is still applicable.

E. Assessing the Factors of Initiative Interpretation
As the disagreement over the use or non-use of post-election evidence such as legislative-administrative construction demonstrates, the
courts have not developed a standard test to interpret initiative statutes.
It is reasonable to assume, however, that any thorough investigation into
the intent of an initiative should consider each factor. The language of
the statute is the traditional starting point for statutory interpretation.
In many situations, however, the words of the initiative alone will not
resolve all ambiguities. Despite inconsistency among decisions using the
remaining factors, each factor is significant and should be considered
when interpreting an initiative.
The factors, however, may not be equally relevant in determining
the intent of a statute that originated as an initiative. Thus, one might
question the Castro court's outright rejection of post-election evidence126. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 312, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The court also held
that the provision applied only to felonies involving "moral turpitude." Id. at 314, 696 P.2d at
119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
127. Id. at 312, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
128.

Id. at 311, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 724.

129. Id.
130. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 246-47, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300-01, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258-59 (1978).
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a less extreme approach is more appropriate. The legislature is composed of the people's representatives. Similarly, the agencies administering a statute are departments within the executive branch and, as such,
are related to representative government. Legislative and administrative
construction should be considered as evidence of the people's intent.
If one accepts the premise that the intent of an initiative is to be
found in the beliefs of the electorate at the time of passage, the ballot
pamphlet and the events leading to the passage of the initiative are more
relevant to determining its meaning than post-election constructions.
The ballot pamphlet is an appealing document for this purpose since, as
noted above, it is made available to every voter, and is designed to be an
objective assessment of the proposition. Its usefulness, however, is limited by the degree to which voters read and comprehend it. The events
leading to the passage of the initiative, including prior legislation and
messages directed at the electorate, also provide pertinent information
because they put the initiative in a political and social context, addressing
why the voters believed the measure was necessary and what problems
they hoped to remedy. This factor has obvious appeal as an appropriate
means to determine the intent behind a proposition. Its drawback is its
subjectivity and the danger that the intent found to underlie the initiative
is not that of the electorate, but that of the judge.
Each of the four factors is capable of contributing to a thorough
analysis of an initiative's intent. In developing a test, however, it is difficult to determine how much weight to accord each factor. A general
matter to consider when assigning weight to each factor is that factors
that seem to reflect best the intent of the average voter, such as newspaper and television reports, are likely to require the most judicial speculation. One commentator has suggested a solution to this problem,
proposing that courts should use inherently subjective materials only
when more reliable evidence has not led to a clear interpretation of the
statute.13 1 Ultimately, though, one must acknowledge the inescapably
discretionary nature of statutory construction. Once the factors of interpretation are identified, the responsibility of defining their relative importance rests with the principled discretion of those charged with
construing an initiative. The importance of this task is intensified when
the subject of an initiative concerns matters of great concern to the public, such as Proposition 65's relationship to the regulation of substances
hazardous to human health.
131. Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the InterpretationofPopularlyEnacted Legislation,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 179 (1989) (authored by Elizabeth A. McNellie).
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III. Determining the Purposes of Proposition 65
Careful consideration of Proposition 65 reveals that its fundamental
purpose is to provide protection and information to the public regarding
carcinogens and reproductive toxins. This examination, however, also
shows that provisions in the statute affect this goal by limiting and defining it. While the provisions are not purposes in and of themselves, one
can logically assume that they were included in the initiative for a reason.
Although not every factor of initiative interpretation reveals a bright line
between the primary purposes and the other features of Proposition 65, a
distinction can be made. Proposed amendments to Proposition 65 might
fail to further its purposes either by directly limiting the scope of the
protection and information provisions, or by impairing the ability of the
secondary mechanisms of the statute to achieve its fundamental
purposes.
A.

The Fundamental Goals of Proposition 65

Applying the four-factor test to Proposition 65 reveals that the basic
goal of the statute is to protect human health and to inform the public.
Its mechanisms serve to implement and define the basic aim of the statute. To comply with the "furtherance-of-purposes" standard, judicial
scrutiny of amendments to the statute must determine whether the proposal is consistent with the primary goal of protecting human health.
Amendments that compromise the primary goal of Proposition 65
should be subject to greater scrutiny than those that change the statute
but do not affect its power to protect and inform the public.
Several factors identify Proposition 65's primary purpose as that of
protecting and informing the public. The language of the Act demonstrates that Proposition 65 originated from a belief that the existing regulation of toxic substances was inadequate to protect human health. As
section one of the Act states:
The people of California find that hazardous chemicals pose a serious
potential threat to their health and well-being, that state government
agencies have failed to provide them with adequate protection, and
that these failures have been serious enough to lead to investigations by
of the administration of California's toxic protection
federal agencies
32
programs. 1
This opening statement is followed by a declaration of rights, which
also suggests that the primary goal of the initiative is to provide protection and information to the people regarding toxic chemicals. The people first declare the right, "To protect themselves and the water they
drink against chemicals that cause cancer, birth defects, or other repro132. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, § 1, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West Supp. 1989).
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ductive harm [and] [t]o be informed about exposures to chemicals
that
33
cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm."'
The measure then declares the need for strict regulation of toxics to
"deter actions that threaten public health and safety." 134 This right also
relates to the primary goal of Proposition 65. Finally, the statute declares that the cost of toxic pollution will be shifted from the taxpayers to
offenders. 13 5 While this right does not point directly to protection and
information, it is consistent with the idea that these two goals are the
primary purposes of the statute. It supports these purposes by promising
to deter polluters through the imposition of greater costs for their illegal
actions. In sum, the opening language of Proposition 65 substantially
supports the idea that its primary goal is to protect and inform the
public.
Events leading to the passage of the statute also support this view of
the purposes of Proposition 65. Evidence concerning laws regulating
toxic substances before the passage Proposition 65 suggests that the public justifiably may have felt dissatisfied with their effectiveness. A report
by the California Senate Office of Research states that production of
man-made substances greatly surpasses scientific research on the effects
of these substances.136 Because most substances are not regulated until
evidence suggests they are harmful, 137 chemicals are being used in the
human environment; in homes, in the workplace, and on food, without
adequate knowledge of the risks they may pose to health.
The Office of Research report cites a study by the United States
General Accounting Office that "projected that the Environmental Protection Agency will not complete its examination of specific health effects
studies for currently registered pesticides until sometime in the twentyfirst century. [The study] estimated that the National Toxicology Program has examined perhaps 700 out of 70,000 to 240,000 man-made substances."' 38 Another statistic reveals the same inaction: "no regulatory
action has been taken on 23 out of 61 chemicals for which the [National
139
Toxicology Program] found strong evidence of carcinogenicity."'
This situation has serious implications. A 1985 study by the State
Economic Development Commission stated that "California is losing
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.

136.

See SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 65, SAFE DRINKING

WATER AND Toxic ENFORCEMENT ACT 1 (1986) (prepared by Bruce Jennings, Ph.D.) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 65].
137. See infra note 150-51 and accompanying text.
138. See ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 65, supra note 135, at 2. According to the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), it is illegal to sell a pesticide that is not
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982).
139. Beardsley, supra note 44, at 20.
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ground in the fight to prevent massive environmental contamination
from toxic chemicals."'1' 4 The study also estimated that "[e]ach year
about 2,500 Californians die of cancer resulting from exposure to toxic
chemicals. Toxic chemical cancers cost California about 1.3 billion a
year." 14 ' As these statistics indicate, the electorate easily could have
concluded that legislation existing prior to Proposition 65 did not provide adequate protection from, or information about, toxic substances.
In addition to the language of the statute and the prevailing standard of regulation prior to the passage of Proposition 65, the ballot pamphlet also suggests that the basic goal of the initiative was to protect
human health from toxic substances more aggressively. The supporters'
portion of the pamphlet alluded to the ineffectiveness of current laws at
the time of the election and the resulting costs of that problem. 4 2 Furthermore, the official description of the initiative, as prepared by the attorney general, states in bold uppercase letters that the initiative would
restrict toxic discharges into drinking water and would require notification of exposure to toxic substances.I 4 3 No other purposes of the initiative are set out as distinctively in the pamphlet. The description of the
initiative written by the legislative analyst also treats protection and information as the primary purposes of the statute; discussing them first, in
detail, and with attention to their effect on current regulation.'l 4 The
enforcement measures of the statute are also mentioned, but perfunctorily. 145 Thus, the ballot pamphlet indicates two significant facts: that the
140.

CALIF. ECON. DEV. COMM'N, POISONING PROSPERITY: THE IMPACT OF Toxlcs ON

CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY X

(1985).

141. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
142. Reiner, Torres & Newman, Argument in Favor of Proposition 65, in BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 54.
143. Official Title andSummary ofProposition 65, in BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at
52.
144. * Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 52.
145. The analysis reads:
This measure proposes two additional requirements for businesses employing 10
or more people. First, it generally would prohibit those businesses from knowingly
releasing into any source of drinking water any chemical in an amount that is known
to cause cancer or in an amount that exceeds 1/1,000th of the amount necessary for
an observable effect on "reproductive toxicity." The term "reproductive toxicity" is
not defined. Second, the measure generally would require those businesses to warn
people before knowingly and intentionally exposing them to chemicals that cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity. The measure would require the state to issue lists of
substances that cause cancer or reproductive toxicity.
Because these new requirements would result in more stringent standards, the
practical effect of the requirements would be to impose new conditions for the issuance of permits for discharges into sources of drinking water. In order to implement
the new requirements, state agencies that are responsible for issuing permits would be
required to alter state regulations and develop new standards for the amount of
chemicals that may be discharged into sources of drinking water.
The measure also would impose civil penalties and increase existing fines for
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Secretary of State's office (which compiles the pamphlets) and the attorney general felt that the goals of protection and information were paramount and that the voters who read the pamphlets might have been
influenced by this determination.
Another factor of initiative interpretation, the construction of the
statute by the administrative agencies charged with its implementation,
also supports the conclusion that the primary purpose of Proposition 65
is to protect and inform the public. Neither the legislature nor the California Health and Welfare Agency, 146 has explicitly defined the purposes
of Proposition 65. The Health and Welfare Agency, however, has
promulgated regulations that are required by the statute to further its
purposes. 147 These regulations illustrate the administrative construction
of the law. For example, an interpretive guideline states, "The Act was
specifically intended to protect sources of drinking water and to provide
information about exposures to certain chemicals."' 148 In addition, administrators from the Department of Health Services, the Health and
Welfare Agency and the Scientific Advisory Panel have referred to the
voters' perception of the goals of the statute as involving protection of
149
health and dissemination of information.
In conclusion, the factors of initiative interpretation support the
conclusion that two fundamental purposes underlie Proposition 65. The
language of the statute, the ballot pamphlet, the regulations, and evidence that regulation prior to Proposition 65 was deficient, all indicate
that public protection and information are Proposition 65's primary purposes. The statute relies, however, on provisions that are not directly
related to these primary purposes to achieve its objectives quickly and
efficiently.
B. The Secondary Features of Proposition 65
Although Proposition 65 is designed to protect and inform the public, many of its provisions do not directly pertain to these functions. Instead, they supplement the fundamental purposes of the statute. These
toxic discharges. In addition, the measure would allow state or local governments,
or any person acting in the public interest, to sue a business that violates these rules.

Id.
146. The California Health and Welfare Agency is designated by Governor Deukmejian as
the lead agency for implementing Proposition 65. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25249.12 (West Supp. 1989); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 12102(e) (1988).
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12 (West Supp. 1989).
148. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 26, § 201(a) (1987) (reprinted in NOSSAMAN, GUTHNER,
KNOX & ELLIOTT, SURVIVING PROPOSITION 65 SUPPLEMENT F-11 (1987)). The Health and
Welfar Agency has defined interpretive guidelines as "draft regulatory proposal[s]." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 12102(b) (West 1988).
149. Kizer, Warriner & Book, Sound Science in the Implementation of PublicPolicy, 260 J.
A.M.A. 951, 951 (1988).
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provisions are designed to implement the primary purposes of the statute,
although they are not separate purposes. Their design, then, is to shape
and define the statute's underlying goal of protecting and informing the
public. This section will examine provisions of the statute that comprise
three secondary features of the law: shifting the burden of proof, better
enforcement, and limited application. An amendment to the statute
might affect these aspects of Proposition 65. In evaluating such a proposal, one must consider the relationship of the mechanisms to the fundamental purposes of the law and the impact of these amendments on the
ultimate goals of the statute.
(1) Shifting the Burden of Proof
One of Proposition 65's most distinctive features is its placement of
the burden of proof on industry rather than on regulatory agencies.
Proposition 65 flatly prohibits discharges of or exposures to toxins unless
the responsible party can show that its action results in "no significant

risk" or "no observable effect."

150

To escape liability, a polluter must

prove that its discharge or exposure causes no significant risk or no observable effect on human health. In contrast, other environmental laws
do not impose a blanket restriction on emission or discharge of a toxic
substance. 5 1 Rather, the government has the burden of showing that a
substance causes harm before it can exercise its regulatory power. 152
150. These terms are defined in the statute. For example, one of the exemptions to the
warning requirement applies to exposures to carcinogens "for which the person responsible
can show pose[] no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question," and
exposures to reproductive toxins that will have "no observable effect assuming exposure at one
thousand (1,000) times the level in question." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c)
(West Supp. 1989).
In addition, an exemption to the discharge prohibition applies to discharges that "will not
cause any significant amount of the discharged or released chemical to enter any source of
drinking water."

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.9(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The

statute defines the phrase "significant amount" as "any detectable amount" unless the quantity
fits the standards set for exemptions to the warning requirement of § 25249.10(c). CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11(c) (West Supp. 1989).

151. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act § 307, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317 (1982); Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982) (regulation of
toxic substances).
152. The determination of what degree of harm is required before regulation is appropriate
varies. For example, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the regulation of benzene
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, holding that, "before he can promulgate any
permanent health or safety standard, the Secretary [of Labor] is required to make a threshold
finding that a place of employment is unsafe." Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980). Courts, however, often have held that a finding of adverse
health effects by the Environmental Protection Agency deserves deference. See, e.g., Lead
Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980) (regarding EPA's standard for lead).
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The shift in the burden of proof is manifested in the language of the
statute itself, specifically, the provisions concerning the exemptions to the
discharge prohibition and the warning requirement. 53 Under certain
circumstances, the blanket prohibition of discharges of toxic substances
into drinking water sources and the requirement of warning persons who
encounter toxic substances do not apply. Both exemption provisions
provide that the defendant has the burden of proving its release or exposure falls under an allowed exemption standard. The exemption provision for the discharge prohibition states, "In any action brought to
enforce Section 25249.5, the burden of showing that a discharge or ' re54
lease meets the criteria of this subdivision shall be on the defendant."'
A similar requirement is set forth in connection with actions to enforce
the warning requirement.

155

Prior to the passage of Proposition 65, its supporters argued that the
shift in the burden of proof would speed the regulation of toxic sub56
stances by giving industry an incentive to help, not hinder, the process. 1
Under typical environmental statutes, research into the toxicity of a substance means potential regulation. Thus, it may often be in the best interest of industry to postpone conclusive findings. Proposition 65, on the
other hand, motivates industries to research the toxic substances used in
their products and find levels of no significant risk to avoid triggering the
statute. As Attorney General John Van De Kamp described the initiative a few days before the election,
The measure thus creates a major incentive for both industry and government to establish scientifically determined 'safe levels' through regulation. There is no such incentive now, and the result has too often

been an interminable debate over each chemical's potential for harm at
different concentrations without enforceable standards to protect the
public. 157

The shift in the burden of proof is related closely to Proposition 65's
fundamental goal of protecting and informing the public. In theory, the
public will be subjected to fewer carcinogens and reproductive toxins because the statute imposes liability on those who discharge these substances into sources of drinking water or who do not warn the population
of exposures. To escape liability, those responsible for discharges and
exposures must prove that the level of the chemical does not pose a significant risk to human health. In order to satisfy this burden, research on
dangerous substances must have been carried out to establish safe levels
for the chemicals in question. Thus, one can conclude that the results of
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.9, 25249.10 (West Supp. 1989).
154. Id. § 25249.9. See also id. § 25249. 10 (regarding the burden of proof in enforcement
actions for the warning requirement).
155. Id. § 25249.10.
156. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at 1 12, col. 1; Van De Kamp, supra note 74, at II 5, col. 1.
157. See Van De Kamp, supra note 74.
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this research benefit industry by providing exemption from the statute,
and benefit the public by providing greater knowledge regarding hazardous substances.
The plain language of the statute that shifts the burden of proof and
the comments made prior to the election regarding the objective of these
provisions reveal the significance of the shift in the burden of proof to the
goals of Proposition 65. This shift must be regarded as an integral part
of the statute. For this reason, any bills proposed by the legislature affecting the statute's placement of the burden of proof require especially
careful consideration. If adopted, such an amendment should receive
heightened scrutiny by the courts to ensure that it furthers the purposes
158
of the law.
(2) The Citizen Enforcement Provision
Another distinctive aspect of Proposition 65 is its provision for citizen enforcement, 159 including significant awards to private individuals. 160 Citizen enforcement provisions are not unusual in federal
environmental statutes, 16 1 however, California laws traditionally have
not conferred a private right of action. 162 Proposition 65 is also unique
in awarding twenty-five percent of the damages assessed by the court to
163
private plaintiffs who successfully sue to enforce the statute.
The language of the statute clearly allows citizens to file suit against
suspected violators of the law. Citizens must notify the proper government prosecutor sixty days before filing suit and the government must
have failed to prosecute the alleged violator.'6 The statute provides that
fifty percent of the damage award goes to the Hazardous Substance Account in the General Fund. 165 Twenty-five percent of the award goes to
the health officer in the jurisdiction where the violation occurred to assist
with enforcement of the statute. 166 The remaining twenty-five percent of
the award goes to the office of the government attorney who prosecuted
158. In addition, the apparent success of the shifted burden of proof warrants some attention. According to one of the drafters of Proposition 65, the strategy of shifting the burden of
proof has begun to achieve the fundamental goals of the initiative: "Under this new incentive,
California has managed to draw the line for more chemicals in the last twelve months than the

federal government has managed under the Toxic Substances Control Act in the last twelve
years." Roe, Drawing the Line on Toxics, The Recorder, Sept. 15, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
159. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25224.7(d) (West Supp. 1989).
160. Id. § 25192.
161. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (1982); Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
162. NOSSAMAN, supra note 59, at 123.
163. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25192 (West Supp. 1989).
164. Id. § 25249.7(d).

165.

Id. § 25192(a).

166.

Id.
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the case, or to a private individual if the case was brought under the
67
1
citizen enforcement provision.

Statements made by both sides of the Proposition 65 debate illustrate the significance of the citizen enforcement provision. According to
one writer, this provision was "[e]asily the most misunderstood and controversial provision of Proposition 65." 168 Another analyst wrote that
the citizen suit provision was "the most anxiety-producing provision in
the initiative."' 69 Opponents to the initiative dubbed the clause a
"bounty-hunter" provision, 70 because of its distribution of damage
awards. The argument against the initiative in the ballot pamphlet declared in large letters, "Fact: Proposition 65's bounty-hunter provision is
a bonanza for private lawyers." 171 The Los Angeles Times did not endorse Proposition 65, in part because of the citizen enforcement provi' 72
sion, which the editors termed "frontier justice."'
Despite these criticisms of the provision, the electorate passed the
initiative. Although one cannot claim that a vote for Proposition 65 was
also an affirmative vote for the citizen suit provision, the prospect of private individuals suing to enforce the statute and receiving part of the
damage award did not offend a majority of the voters. Furthermore, the
citizen enforcement provision is closely related to the rights declared by
the people of California in section one of the statute, particularly the
right "[t]o secure strict enforcement of the laws controlling hazardous
17 3
chemicals and deter actions that threaten public health and safety."'
These two factors should be considered by the legislature and the courts
when examining bills that would affect citizen enforcement of Proposition 65. Amendments that impair this provision will compromise the
fundamental purposes of the statute.
(3) Exemptions
In addition to its distinctive provisions shifting the burden of proof
and allowing citizen enforcement, Proposition 65 also contains several
exemptions. For example, the discharge prohibition and warning requirements are not triggered for a period of time after a substance is
listed as toxic.'
167.

74

In addition, the "Definitions" provision of the statute

Id. § 25192(a).
NOSSAMAN, supra note 59, at 121.
Dragna, The Problems with Prop 65: Will California's Toxics Initiative Hold Water?,
L.A. LAWYER 18, 20 (April 1987).
170. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at 1 12, col. 1 & 20, col. 1.
171. Arres, Voss & Ottoboni, Argument Against Proposition 65 in BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 2, at 55.
172. L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1986, at II 4, col. 1.
173. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 § 1, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West Supp. 1989).
174. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.9, 25249.10 (West Supp. 1989) (dis168.
169.
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exempts businesses with fewer than ten employees and all government
agencies.17 5 In view of the enormous amounts of toxic substances used in
California, the exclusion of small businesses from Proposition 65 is not as
surprising as the exemption for government agencies.' 7 6 As the opponents to Proposition 65 pointed out, the exemption allows operations
such as nuclear power plants, county landfills, public water systems and
military bases to escape the provisions of the statute.' 77 Thus, the government exemption is a significant limitation on the statute and a crucial
factor in shaping and defining its scope.
Events prior to the passage of the initiative indicate that the government exemption was highly controversial. One news report identified it
as "[t]he central theme of the anti-initiative advertising."' 178 The election
campaign revealed that the exemption posed an interesting political
irony: proponents of the initiative wanted to limit its impact; those opposed to it argued that it was too weak. Environmentalists supporting
Proposition 65 defended the exemption saying that most of the hazardous substances in government-run water systems and dumps result from
the activities of private industry. 79 Furthermore, supporters stated that
applying Proposition 65 apply to government agencies would mean a far
more complex initiative with relatively little impact, since "'[i]t would
mean moving $2,500 from one pocket to another.' "180 Opponents
pointed out that the reason for the government exemption may have been
based less on reasonableness than on expediency: "[i]f they included government, the onus-would be on the taxpayer ... They would
have virtu181
ally every government jurisdiction down on their necks."
Pinning down the opposition's justification for its position is equally
difficult. Arguing against a measure on the ground that it is too lenient is
not necessarily inconsistent with wanting to achieve the same goal .of the
proposed law. Thus, even those who would want stricter protection from
carcinogens might object to Proposition 65 because of the government
exemption. Such was probably not the case, however. For example, it
seems doubtful that Chevron, a major financial contributor to the initiative's opposition,182 objected to Proposition 65 because it did not impose
strict enough controls on companies like itself. This inconsistency may
charge prohibition does not apply to a substance until 20 months after it is listed; the warning
requirement does not take effect for 12 months after listing.)
175. Id. § 25249.11(b).
176. For example, a nuclear power plant operated by the government is exempt from
Proposition 65.
177. Arres, Voss & Ottoboni, Argument Against Proposition 65 in BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 2, at 55.

178. L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1987, at I 3, col.5.
179. L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at I 3, col.5.
180. L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1986, at 112, col. 1 & 20, col. 1.
181. L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at I 3, col. 5 & 34, col. 1.
182. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 741 (Sept. 19, 1986).
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have contributed to the opposition's loss. As one of the media consultants for the "No on 65" campaign pointed out, "you can't build our
18 3
constituency with people who don't belong on our side."'
The political irony posed by the governmental exemption illustrates
two important points about the exemption. First, the exemption was a
highly visible aspect of the initiative campaign. The opposition's drive
against the measure focused on it, 18 4 newspaper articles presented the
polarized positions held by the two camps,1 5 and the ballot pamphlet
referred to it. 1 86 Thus, one can assume comfortably that most voters
were aware of the exemption. Second, the exemption could have either
gained or lost votes for the initiative. It may be that the exemption was a
strategic move by the proponents of Proposition 65, designed to avoid
voter alienation by nullifying forecasts of wasted taxpayer dollars as a
result of sizable liabilities for local, state, and federal governments. On
the other hand, the exemption might have turned some voters against the
initiative. Some may have believed that it was unfair to exempt government agencies when private businesses face significant penalties. Others
may have felt that they should hold out for a stronger law that would not
contain the exemption.
Thus, determining the intent of the electorate with respect to the
government exemption is especially difficult. Even those who agreed
with the fundamental goals of protecting and informing the public may
not have supported the initiative if they thought it would eventually penalize taxpayers. On the other hand, those who voted for the initiative
may have done so although they objected to the exemption, preferring
some additional protection from toxic substances to none at all. Presumably, this group of voters would support an amendment to Proposition 65
eliminating the government exemption.
In analyzing amendments to the statute that would affect the exemption, the central question must be whether the exemption frustrates
the fundamental goals of Proposition 65, or is an affirmative limitation
on its scope. As discussed above, voter intent does not present a simple
answer, since it is essentially unresolved. The next section argues that an
amendment eliminating the exemption could be validly upheld, despite
the difficulties presented here.
183. King, supra note 30, at I 1, col. 1 & 21, col. 6.
184. L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at I 3, col. 5.
185. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
186. Reiner, Torres & Newman, Argument in Favor of Proposition 65, BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 54-55; Arres, Voss & Ottoboni, Argument Against Proposition 65,
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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IV. Examples of Proposed and Possible Amendments to
Proposition 65-Are They in Furtherance
of Its Purposes?
This section discusses various possible amendments to Proposition
65 and analyzes why they are or are not in furtherance of the initiative's
purposes. Proposals to amend sections of the law such as the government agency exemption 87 and the citizen-enforcement have already been
advanced. 88 Although these proposals were unsuccessful, future attempts to amend the law seem certain, particularly in light of the controversial and complex nature of Proposition 65.
A. An Amendment to Make Proposition 65 Apply to Government Agencies
As discussed in the previous section, Proposition 65 specifically exempts all government agencies and public water systems. Although this
exemption was the primary target of the "No on 65" campaign, 189 prior
to the election proponents of the initiative contemplated amending the
initiative after its passage to make it applicable to government agencies.190 Shortly after its passage, a bill was introduced in the state senate
that would have effected this change. 191 Although vetoed by the Governor, the bill provided that the discharge and exposure prohibitions of the
statute would apply to government agencies with the following exceptions: releases pre-empted by federal law, specified discharges by public
water systems and from certain watersheds, stormwater runoff, and releases relating to public emergencies, such as firefighting. 192 The bill also
expanded Proposition 65's application to certain discharges by privatelyowned public water systems.'93
The proposed bill raises a significant issue: can the legislature amend
Proposition 65 to remove entirely one of the sections of the statute? Can
such an amendment be successfully challenged as not in furtherance of
the purposes of Proposition 65? One argument against an amendment
making the statute apply to government agencies is that the electorate
voted for the initiative as it stood. The argument continues that although
the measure provided for amendment, the electorate did not intend such
a substantial revision of the law. Furthermore, it is possible that if the
187. See infra notes 189-197 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
189. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 742 (Sept. 19, 1986).
190. L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at 1 34, col. 3; Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at II 5, col. 1;
L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1986, at I 12, col. 1.
191. S.B. 269, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1987-1988 (amended August 1, 1988) (vetoed by Gov.
Deukmejian on Aug. 12, 1988).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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proposition had applied to government agencies before the election, it
194
may not have passed.
Despite these arguments, the amendment should properly be viewed
as furthering the purposes of Proposition 65. The amendment expands
the discharge and exposure prohibitions, broadens the scope of the statute, and remains consistent with its purposes of protecting and informing
the public. Although the voters approved limiting the application of
these provisions, many of them may have voted in favor of Proposition
65 in spite of the limitation, not because of it. As one media consultant
working to defeat the initiative recognized, "The people who buy the
exemptions argument all want a stronger law." 195 Since the issue before
the voters was focused clearly on toxic pollution, not on government exemptions, a vote against toxins does not equal necessarily a vote for the
government exemption.1 96 Furthermore, although the current law expressly exempts government agencies, changing this provision of the statute does not necessarily violate the purposes of the law. Provisions are
not purposes; section seven of the Act allowing for amendment by the
contemplated that
legislature suggests that the drafters of the initiative
97
revised.
be
to
need
would
statute
parts of the
B. An Amendment to the Citizen-Enforcement Provisions of the Statute
Like the exemption for government agencies, the citizen-enforcement provision of Proposition 65 was a controversial aspect of the initiative and a likely target for amendment by the legislature. A few months
after the election, an assembly bill was proposed that would have substantially affected the citizen-enforcement portions of the statute.198 This
proposal probably frustrates the intent of the electorate in passing the
initiative.
For example, the bill interferes with the purposes of better protection and information regarding toxics by requiring that a person suffer or
expect to suffer "an unreasonable and adverse health or environmental
effect from the discharge, release, or exposure" 199 in order to sue for violations of the law. This requirement does not further the purposes of
Proposition 65 because it shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff, rather
than placing it on the business responsible for violating the statute. The
194. See supra text accompanying note 181.
195. King, supra note 30, at I 21, col. 6.
196. More specifically, the electorate was voting to increase protection and information
regarding toxic substances. Thus, the government exemption provision differs from those
shifting the burden of proof and allowing citizen enforcement. These two latter provisions are
consistent with better protection and information.
197. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act § 7, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25249.5 (West Supp. 1989) (historical note).
198.
199.

A.B. 1332, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1987-1988.
Id.
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difficulty of establishing injury from exposure to carcinogens is illustrated by the town of McFarland, California, where the cancer rate for
children is four hundred times higher then normal. 2°° McFarland has an
agricultural economy; pesticides are sprayed on the lands surrounding
the town,
[y]et the cause of the cancers has never been proven. Though the state
Department of Health Services has evaluated hundreds of these chemicals and possible exposures to them, no cause has been found for the
high rate of childhood cancers here. And considering the daily complex changes in the chemical environment of McFarland, the answer
may 20
never
be found. The only certainty is that something happened
1
here.
The bill also discourages rather than encourages citizens to bring
actions against violators. The bill requires that unsuccessful plaintiffs
pay the defendant's reasonable costs and attorney's fees. This provision
alone would deter citizens who contemplate suing a large corporation.
Coupled with the burden of proof problem, the provision would negate a
fundamental purpose of Proposition 65-reducing the public's exposure
to harmful chemicals.
Another disincentive of the bill is its attempt to limit the amount a
successful plaintiff can recover.20 2 Instead of receiving twenty-five percent of the penalties assessed against the violator, a plaintiff might lose
money. The bill limits recovery to reasonable costs and attorney's fees
up to twenty-five percent of the collected penalty. If costs and fees exceeded one quarter of the penalty, presumably the plaintiff would be left
to pay those amounts from his own pocket.
Because of the bill's likely effect on the citizen-enforcement provision of Proposition 65, it is not in furtherance of the purposes of the
statute. It might, however, be useful to dispel cynical attitudes toward
this provision by an amendment to the citizen-enforcement provision replacing the flat twenty-five percent of penalties that a plaintiff can recover under the present law with an amount to be determined by a judge
or a jury. Consideration of such an amendment should examine whether
citizens would be substantially less likely to sue under the changed law.
Finally, one should not overlook the fact that a citizen's successful suit
over a Proposition 65 violation could often benefit many others exposed
to the same toxic substance. Penalties are allocated to enforcement funds
as well as the plaintiff, and injunctive relief and warning labels could also
have state-wide significance.
200.
nia, San
201.
202.

Shavelson, 'The NightmareStays with Us,'Dread and Death in McFarland,CaliforFrancisco Chron., Nov. 6, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
Id.
A.B. 1332, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1987-1988.
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Conclusion
As these proposed amendments to Proposition 65 illustrate, the future of the initiative depends on its interpretation by those other than the
electorate that passed it. Thus, determination of the purposes of the statute is a crucial exercise. Application of the four factors of analysis described in section II provides a basic picture of the purposes of
Proposition 65. It is clear, however, that an abstract examination of the
intent of the initiative cannot supply every purpose that Proposition 65
might have. It is not possible to anticipate all potential proposals to
amend the statute. The future of the initiative rests with responsible legislators, administrators and judges: they must interpret its purposes consistently with the promises of Proposition 65. Any amendment that
affects the primary purposes of protection and information should be
scrutinized carefully to determine whether the change would advance or
frustrate these goals. In that way, Californians can be assured that the
promises of Proposition 65 will be kept.

